前一阵子闹得沸沸扬扬的伦敦银行同业拆借利率丑闻（The Libor Scandal）一案让银行界从此名誉扫地。经历了一场严重的金融危机之后，又随之而来一系列丑闻，于是现在人们都认为一定是一群不称职的奸商在操控银行。如此看来，人们如此厌恶被英国央行（Bank of England）副行长保罗·塔克（Paul Tucker）称为“垃圾堆”的部分银行业，也是不足为奇了。但是，仅仅是民众们的厌恶情绪还不至于给银行业带来改革性的变化。在此，我想对于如何恰当应对给出7则建议。
首先，我们要在心理上做好准备，要明白，那么多钱都岌岌可危，所以一定会出现许多过激行为。公众反应强烈是好的，因为他们如此表态正好可以给那些疏于管理的领导们一剂警示针。我们都应该更加实际一些，要知道所有的银行家从事银行业工作其实都是为了钱，不管你高不高兴，这一点是不会改变的。
第二，还是有很多方法可以是用来降低丑闻再三传播的可能性的，重罚是一个法子，增加透明度也能奏效。银行家们应该向民众公开实际交易数据，这种增加透明度的法子虽不是拯救银行业的灵丹妙药，却也能起到不容小觑的作用。
第三，银行需要大量增加股本。这一点也同样与之前的Libor丑闻有关。反观2008年10月，如果那时人们没有认定银行业正濒临崩溃边缘，那么监管机构就不会对报导的相对较高的伦敦银行同业拆借利率那么担心。消除这一恐惧的办法就是注入更多资金，英国央行新财政政策委员会（FPC）委员罗伯特·詹金斯（Robert Jenkins）最近在一次精彩的演讲中如此辩称。
第四，增加股本并不代表要将其增加100%。劳伦斯·克特里考夫（Laurence Kotlikoff）此时并不建议他口中的“有限目的银行”，而是建议要将银行业整个送入坟墓。我承认目前官方提出的33:1的杠杆比率确实是高的惊人，但我也不明白为什么消除杠杆比率会是正确方法。永远不会失败的中间机构也有点安全的过头了吧。
第五，在规定增加股本时，一定要意识到所谓的“风险加权”资产将会引起银行和监管机构的相互博弈。正如曾担任世界银行（World Bank）执行董事的佩尔·库罗夫斯基（Per Kurowski）经常告诫我的那样，危机发生时，往往是被认为风险很低的领域实际上会变得风险很高，所以，未加权的杠杆比率十分关键，它还需要被调得更低。
第六，要实现曾经包括我在内的银行业独立委员会（ICB）提出的所有建议，现在变得更加迫切了。尤其是，在出现危机的时候银行可以轻易的被解散：加强对零售银行（在零售银行必须保持持续不断的服务）的“圈护”可以促成这一目标的实现。更重要的是，必须保证各个子公司都和总部集团一样，无论在何种情况下都有足够数量的股本，以具备真正可靠的偿付能力。除此之外，还要解决充分吸收亏损债务的问题，以防止可能出现的资不抵债。简言之，银行无论何时都要保持一个较大的安全边际。
对零售银行的“圈护”还应该减少短期的投资银行交易文化所带来的负面影响。这也就是为什么政府应当重新考虑自己打算提供更多零售银行的“简易”衍生品的想法了。但也别太天真了，零售银行很可能不是行为不端就是破产。
实际上，英国现在必须面临的一个难题是，鉴于如今走低的利率水平，良性的零售银行模式到底还存不存在。我认为，零售银行痛苦的丑闻史——包括“未经授权的透支行为的粗暴对待”和“支付保障保险（PPI）的不当销售”——都反映了银行并未对其提供的服务进行合理收费。
最后，比起丑闻发生之前，我并不觉得有更多的把零售银行和投资银行完全区分开的必要，前提条件是，投资银行的资本必须完全分离独立于零售银行的存款基础（投资银行无法随意动用零售银行的资本）。记住，零售银行也是必须保证有足够股本的，因为它们也可能面临风险。各种各样的组织集团们在危机发生时都能够帮助旗下子公司一把。之前提议的“圈护”恰好说明了完全分离有什么作用，但同时在大集团里也一定要保留多元化的好处。
当然，有了更高的资本要求，加之可控制存款和政府隐性补贴的流失，投资银行的融资成本将会上涨，但这种上涨无疑是健康无害的。只要银行家们的收入和从属债权人的利益更加紧密的挂钩，那些各种形式不负责任的冒险行为应该就会慢慢消失了。
最近披露的丑闻激怒了公众是可以理解的，然而愤怒永远都是政策基础中的定时炸弹。那个银行家被当地人当做医生一样尊敬的时代早已一去不复返。虽然我们永远无法把银行家变成心目中的圣人，但是我们却可以改变对银行家的激励，银行的结构和监管的重点。我想要看到的是，银行业朝着大幅降低杠杆比率和显著提升透明度的方向大步迈进。至少，我会尽我所能去消除那种投资银行背后有国家撑腰的想法。这样想真的是大错特错了，所以“圈护”措施势在必行。
我们不能寄希望于出现奇迹，但我们可以想办法让银行变得更好用，更安全。专心致力于此吧！
The Libor scandal has nailed the coffin of the banks’ reputations shut. After a huge financial crisis and a long list of scandals, banks are now viewed as incompetent profiteers run by spivs. Such disgust over what Paul Tucker, deputy governor of the Bank of England, has called a “cesspit” is quite natural. But disgust alone must not shape reform. Here are my seven suggestions of how best to respond.
First, accept that misbehaviour is going to happen, particularly where so much money is at stake. It is good that the public reacts strongly, since that will discourage managerial insouciance. But let us be realistic: bankers are in this for the money and, like it or not, always will be.
Second, there are ways of lowering the risk of such a scandal being repeated: heavy penalties are one, more transparency another. Data for actual transactions should be used. Transparency is no panacea for the ills of banking. But it would help.
Third, banks need far more equity. This, too, is relevant to the Libor scandal. Regulators would have been far less worried about relatively high reported Libor rates in October 2008 if people had not believed the banks were dangerously close to collapse. The answer to that fear is more capital, as Robert Jenkins, a member of the Bank of England’s new Financial Policy Committee, has argued in a superb recent speech.
Fourth, more equity cannot mean 100 per cent equity. Laurence Kotlikoff suggests not what he calls “limited purpose banking”, but the end of banking. I accept that leverage of 33 to one, as now officially proposed, is frighteningly high. But I cannot see why the right answer should be no leverage at all. An intermediary that can never fail is surely also far too safe.
Fifth, in setting these equity requirements, it is essential to recognise that so-called “risk-weighted” assets can and will be gamed by both banks and regulators. As Per Kurowski, a former executive director of the World Bank, reminds me regularly, crises occur when what was thought to be low risk turns out to be very high risk. For this reason, unweighted leverage matters. It needs to be far lower.
Sixth, the case for implementing all the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking, of which I was a member, is now even stronger. In particular, it remains vital that banks be easily resolved, in the event of mishap: ringfencing of the retail banks, where continuity of service is essential, should facilitate this. It is also vital to ensure that subsidiaries and the group as a whole have both sufficient quantities of equity to be credibly solvent under nearly all circumstances, and sufficient loss-absorbing debt to be resolved, should they get close to the margin of insolvency. In brief, banks need a large margin of safety, at all times.
The ringfencing of retail banking should also reduce its contamination by the short-term trading culture of investment banking. This is one reason why the government should reconsider its decision to let retail banks provide “simple” derivatives. But do not be naive about this: retail banks can both misbehave and fail.
Indeed, a question the UK must now face is whether a sound model of retail banking exists, given today’s low interest rates. I would argue that the painful history of scandals in retail banking, including the brutal treatment of unauthorised overdrafts and the misselling of “payment protection insurance”, reflects the absence of sound charging for the costs of providing banking services.
Finally, I see no more persuasive a case for full separation of retail from investment banking than before the scandal, provided funding of the latter is separated from the deposit base of the former. Retail banks must also retain adequate equity. Remember that retail banking is also risky. Diversified groups are able to help out their subsidiaries in a crisis. The proposed ringfence would deliver exactly what full separation can do, but retain the benefit of diversification in a larger group.
Of course, with higher capital requirements and the loss of both captive deposits and the implicit subsidy from governments, the cost of funds to investment banking would rise. But that would surely be healthy. If the pay of bankers were also aligned more closely with the interests of junior creditors, many of the more irresponsible forms of risk-taking should in time disappear.
It is understandable that recent scandals have enraged the public. But rage is always a dangerous basis for policy. The days when the local bank manager was almost as respected as the doctor have long gone. We are never going to turn bankers into saints. But we can change the incentives facing bankers, the structure of banking and the focus of regulation. Where I would go further is towards substantially lower leverage and significantly greater transparency. Not least, I would do everything I can to eliminate the idea that the state stands behind investment banking. That is an insane idea. This is one reason why the ringfence is vital.
We cannot hope for miracles. But we can make bankers more useful and less dangerous. Focus on that.
