中国公司已在全球市场上初露锋芒。华为刚刚超越瑞典的爱立信公司，问鼎世界最大的电信设备制造商。虽然很多外国人连“华为”也不会说（有的人管它叫“哈歪”，为此，公司还制作了一个视频，来教人们正确发音），华为正越来越强大，在竞争白热化的国际市场中也是数一数二的“大玩家”。海尔，白色家电制造的领军企业，华为正望其项背。如今，联想正与惠普一决高下，有望成为世界上最牛的个人电脑制造商。
身为一家私营公司的华为，是中国打入国际市场的领路人。华为创始人任正非，之前是中国人民解放军的一名工程师。起初的他在中国客户那儿四处碰壁。采取了毛泽东“从农村包围城市”的策略之后，华为成功打开了国际市场：在欧洲，它收购了超过半数已发布的超快4G通讯网络，成为移动电话行业强劲的对手。如今，华为拥有着320亿美元资产、140 000名员工、140个国家的客户，俨然一个商业帝国。此外，由于低价出售高质量的通信设备，华为赢得了广泛的尊重。
抵制华为
除了尊重，也有恐惧，感到恐惧的并不仅仅是华为的商业对手。有传言说华为和中国人民解放军关系过于紧密。西方世界担心华为是中国间谍的“耳目”，在和平时期窃听情报，一旦发动战争，就毫不犹豫地躲开。他们将其视为中国对准网络开战的一件神兵利器。
很多政府严肃待之。澳大利亚在今年早些时候拒绝了华为参与其全国宽带网络的安装；印度也反对华为在这个国家的商业扩张；更不要说在美国了，华为在美国的发展本来就困难重重，现在好了，一个国会情报委员会正欲将华为“解剖”，好看清它的五脏六腑。最近出现了一大批网络攻击，被指认为是中国黑客所为，人们对华为的猜疑有增无减。
除了华为，西方政府同样担心其他一些中国青睐的冠军企业。这些企业得到了津贴、低息贷款、出口信贷等方面的优厚待遇。欧盟委员会正欲对此展开调查。有些人怀疑中国政府通过帮助华为赢得海外合同，好让间谍利用其网络监视世界电子通信。
反对进口的论调，还是小心为妙。否则容易沦为贸易保护主义者打击对手的武器。然而，对通信安全问题的担忧依然很有必要：近来有报道指出中国政府支持黑客大范围去“黑”西方的重要商务秘密。西方情报局对此十分警惕，因为他们本身就是网络攻击者和窃听者（最好的例证就是针对伊朗核项目的Stuxnet病毒）。对华为这样一个网络创造者和管理者来说，它本身就需要潜入恶意软件，并提取出敏感数据。一旦被发现从事间谍活动，华为这样的私营公司必将损失惨重，但是中国式的资本主义的力量毕竟不可小觑，西方世界的担忧也不无道理。
然而禁止华为竞购商业合同的做法就大错特错了。有两个理由。其一，来自整个中国，尤其是来自华为的竞争力能够带来巨大的利益——促进经济增长，造福人民。华为高效低价的设备使得非洲的移动通信改革成为可能。
怀疑和证实
另一个理由就是华为的外国竞争对手们那个肮脏的小秘密，他们竟然避而不谈——在中国，近年来几乎所有人都在生产电信设备。中国的制造商和设计者已经成为国际电信供应链条中不可或缺的一部分。限制华为（或者是它在中国的竞争对手，同样是商业巨头的中兴通信）却给阿尔卡特朗讯或者爱立信大开方便之门，开心的也许是政治家们。但是这并没有安全保障。华为的竞争者们大肆表露他们的担忧，从中捞取既得利益，却掩盖了事情的真相——他们怎么也离不开中国的分包商和补助金。
问题的答案并不是紧盯着中国的公司，而应当着眼大局，采取更加严格的审查。电信公司需要什么条件才能成功，政府应当对此毫不含糊——美国的秘密安全审查过程正好相反。政府更该关心的事是确保设备的安全，而不是谁生产了这个设备。这就意味着要对硬件和软件的来源了如指掌，以及对代码和设备进行深入的随机调查。美国没有行之有效的供应链检查系统。但是在英国（英国电信是华为的大客户），华为已经建立了一个部门（和英国政府通讯总部有着密切的合作），也有了通过安全检查的员工，其中包括前英国政府通讯总部的员工，他们在部门建立之前通过了中国的审查。这样的详细检查必然会增加成本，但是相比某些国家，这样的损失未免不值一提了。他们对中国公司强加限制，结果是削弱了竞争，抬高了售价。
华为其实能让外国人不那么害怕。 它不透明的所有制结构和神秘的公司文化已经使它名声受损。它需要更加开放。这家少数人持股的公司，也许能通过在全球股市上市来扭转乾坤。如果不是在美国上市的话，至少也该在香港。更加开放的态度也许能使美国和其他国家更加清楚地认识到像华为这样的中国公司究竟造成了怎样的威胁——这样他们才不会把自己局限在本地竞争中。
Chinese companies have started to win first place in global markets. Huawei has just overtaken Sweden’s Ericsson to become the world’s largest telecoms-equipment-maker. Even though many foreigners still cannot pronounce its name (some call it “Hawaii”, and the firm has even produced a video teaching people to say hwah-way), Huawei is becoming an increasingly powerful global player, capable of going head-to-head with the best in intensely competitive markets. It follows Haier, which is already the leading white-goods-maker; now Lenovo is challenging Hewlett-Packard as the world’s biggest PC-maker. Plenty more will follow (see article).
Huawei, a private firm, is a standard-bearer in China’s long march into Western markets. Its founder, Ren Zhengfei, who served as an engineer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), at first struggled to win customers even in China. But his company followed Mao’s strategy of using the countryside to encircle and capture the cities, and it has moved on to win foreign markets too: in Europe it is involved in over half of the superfast 4G telecoms networks that have been announced, and it has become a strong competitor in mobile phones (see article). The company is now a $32-billion business empire with 140,000 employees, and customers in 140 countries. It commands respect by delivering high-quality telecoms equipment at low prices.
They did it Huawei
But Huawei inspires fear too—and not just among its competitors. The company is said to be too close for comfort to the PLA. Westerners fret that the networks the firm is building are used by Chinese spooks to eavesdrop during peacetime and could be shut down suddenly during wartime. They see the firm as a potent weapon in China’s burgeoning cyber-arsenal.
It is a view that some governments are taking seriously. Earlier this year Australia blocked Huawei’s participation in a scheme to build a national broadband network in the country. The company has also faced opposition to its commercial expansion in India. And in America, where Huawei’s attempts to grow have often been stymied, a congressional committee that focuses on intelligence matters is putting the firm under a microscope; suspicions have been aggravated by a recent spate of cyber-attacks attributed to Chinese hackers.
Western governments are also suspicious of the subsidies, low-interest loans and generous export credits lavished on favoured champions, including Huawei. The European Commission is considering opening an investigation. Some people suppose that the Chinese government is helping Huawei win overseas contracts so that spies can exploit its networks to snoop on ever more of the world’s electronic traffic.
Arguments against imports always need to be viewed with caution, since they will be used by protectionists to keep emerging rivals out. Still, it is reasonable to worry about security in telecoms: recent reports have pointed to the efforts of Chinese state-sponsored hackers to vacuum up valuable Western commercial secrets on a massive scale. Western intelligence agencies are also alert to the risks of eavesdropping and cyber-attacks because they themselves are practitioners (a prime example being the Stuxnet virus, aimed at Iran’s nuclear programme). As for Huawei, a firm that controls a network’s creation and management is ideally placed to sneak in malware and sneak out sensitive data. Even though it is a private company with an awful lot to lose if it were caught spying, the power of the state in China’s version of capitalism means the West is right to be vigilant.
But banning Huawei from bidding for commercial contracts is wrongheaded, for two reasons. One is that the economic benefit of competition from China in general and Huawei in particular is huge. It boosts growth and thus wellbeing. Huawei’s cheap but effective equipment helped make Africa’s mobile-telecoms revolution possible.
Distrust and verify
The other reason for not banning Huawei is the dirty little secret that its foreign rivals strangely neglect to mention: just about everybody makes telecoms equipment in China these days. Chinese manufacturers and designers have become an integral part of the global telecoms supply chain. Blocking Huawei (or its rival Chinese telecoms giant, ZTE) while allowing gear from, say, Alcatel-Lucent or Ericsson on a network may make politicians feel good. But it is no guarantee of security. Huawei’s competitors have a vested interest in hyping concerns about it, while disguising their own reliance on Chinese subcontractors and on subsidies.
The answer is to insist on greater scrutiny all round, not just of Chinese firms. Governments should be crystal-clear about what conditions telecoms firms need to meet to win business—something America’s secretive security-review process does not do today. They should also do more to ensure that equipment is secure, no matter who makes it. That means demanding to know where hardware components and software come from, and requiring intrusive random inspections of code and equipment. America has no effective system of supply-chain checks. In Britain, by contrast, where BT is a big customer, Huawei has established a unit (run in close co-operation with GCHQ, Britain’s signals-intelligence agency) with security-cleared personnel, including former employees of GCHQ, who vet gear from China before it is installed. Such scrutiny will drive up costs, but these pale in comparison with those imposed by bans on Chinese firms, which diminish competition and push up prices.
Huawei can also help allay foreigners’ fears. The company’s opaque ownership structure and secretive culture have damaged its reputation. It needs to be far more open. One way to achieve this would be for the closely held firm to seek a listing on a global stockmarket—if not in America, then at least in Hong Kong. Greater openness would also help clarify the real threat that Chinese firms such as Huawei pose to America and other countries: that they are starting to out-innovate the home-grown competition.
